ORIGINS AND FOUNDATIONS OF INTERPERSONAL THEORY,
SOCIOMETRY AND MICROSOCIOLOGY

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Note: I apologize for the autobiographic character of this paper, but being exposed to the dynamic comments and criticism of such distinguished scientists as Gurtvitch, Sorokin, von Wiese and Zazzo made a more direct response necessary.

A man may draw his inspiration from a conceptual heaven or hell. Freud once implied (Flectere si nequeo superos, Acheronta movebo," motto to "The Interpretation of Dreams") that he had to go to Hades in order to find some significant connections and interpretations for the world above. My calling was just the opposite, I had to go to heaven to get advice for the world below. I had no alternative, the world in which I found myself when I came to my senses and to my first intellectual formulations about things, was torn to pieces, spiritually and physically. Nietzsche, Marx, and Freud, each in a different area, have brought to effect and to a calamitous end the thought waves which Spinoza had initiated; the Deus sive Natura had further deteriorated to the Lucifer sive Natura. All old values were destroyed for whatever good or bad reasons, new values were not created to replace them. The historical situation compelled me, therefore, to go the whole way of reconstruction in a more radical and extensive way perhaps than anyone else before me in our Western World. Marx saw the position of man as that of a member of society, the struggle within it as his ultimate destiny. Freud saw the position of man as the one of a traveler between birth and death, the cosmos beyond was shattered.

I moved man back into the universe.

Man is more than a psychological, social or biological being. Reducing man’s responsibility to the psychological, social or biological department of living makes him an outcast. Either he is co-responsible for the whole universe or his responsibility means nothing. The life and future of the universe is important, indeed the only thing which matters—more important than the life and death of man as an individual, as a particular civilization or as a species. I postulated therefore that a theory of God comes first. It must be attained first and is indispensable in order to make the life of any particle of the universe significant, whether it is a man, or a protozoon. Science and experimental method, if it be worthy of its claim, must be applicable to the theory of God or whatever the name which we give to a theory or the supreme
value. I was in the strategic position that the old God values were dead and that agnosticism reigned mankind in the first quarter of the twentieth century. I could therefore construct new God values with a certain amount of disregard for past constructions. Theology became to my mind what it literally means—the science of God himself, of the supreme value (not of God's creation, the biography of saints, or the religions of mankind). It is outside of this paper's domain to give a presentation of the theology which I evolved, but it is at least autobiographically significant here that my God-universe pattern became the blueprint, the ontological guide after which I modelled sociometry, the idea of a society in which our deepest selves are realized. It is from my theological analysis and experiments that I drew the inspiration and the certainty to forge ahead in to realms which are entirely secular, materialistic and down to earth. The application of experimental methods to theology prepared me for the task of applying them to human relations. These experiments in theometry helped me to see the loopholes in the current experimental methods in science as proclaimed by Mill. The form which the experimental method in theological science takes differs, of course, from the form it takes in social science which again differ widely from their form in biological or physical science. But there is no "absolute" cleavage between interpersonal, experimental dynamic theology and interpersonal, experimental sociometry. The old impasse between science and theology has ceased to exist except for antiquated theologians and ignorant scientists.

The uninhibited journey of a psychodramatic theometrician throughout the universe could not be continued endlessly. As soon as he settled down to a specific task, his sociometric relation to the nextdoor neighbors, the macroscopic journey became increasingly microscopic to the point where the distance between one neighbor and another appeared to be far greater than the distance between him and the stars.

Georges Gurvitch, carefully examining the foundations of sociometry queries the reasons why certain domains of investigation have not been included by sociometrists, particularly as he formulates it, the "we" in its three degrees of intensity, Mass, Community and Communion. As the critique is particularly addressed towards me I am glad to admit that a great many investigations have yet been outside of my opportunities but at no time have they been outside of my vision. In the work which anticipated and precipitated our concrete sociometric experiments the We problems are at their very essence. But to bring them down to earth cannot be done by piece-
meal. We made lists of hundreds of research projects of which unfortu-
nately only a small part has been brought to realization. All my publica-
tions between 1914 and 1925 are nothing but a reduplication of the ideas of Com-
munity and Communion not only as to their theoretical formulations but as to their realization in practice, bringing them to a reality test in front of a frequently hostile world. A careful reader of my situational dialogues about the author, the orator, and the actor, of my speeches about the mo-
ment, the meeting and anonymity, last not least of my autobiography of the king, will recognize that my very religious preoccupations conditioned me rather to exaggerate than to underrate the importance of the We ex-
perience as expressed in community and communion. Indeed, one may easily recognize that the same brainwave is still operating in techniques like soci-
drama and axiodrama and in my revisions of the experimental method in science. What is my emphatic criticism of the mechanical use of the socio-
metric test, its distortion into a sociometric questionnaire, my recurrent adv-
ocation of sociometric town meetings but a structuring of the sociometric method into a community experience, the most violent systematic expression of We feeling yet crystallized in our time? There is nothing mystic about sociometric meetings or psycho-and sociodramatic sessions but they have to be co-experienced as spectator and actor in order to learn of their full significance. It is exactly the “We” which we cannot put into an article when we write about “us”. But we can materialize and see some phases of the We in a sociodrama.

Origin of Interpersonal Theory

At the turn of the century the formula “the individual versus the Uni-
verse” appeared to be sufficiently wide for expressing the total situation. The socius was yet unborn. One could have multiplied the “individual” by the number of organisms the universe contained. One could also have given every individual the opportunity of projection, everyone projecting his own private world into the universe, filling the universe with more or less harm-
less bubbles. The psychoanalysts were at that period not interested, for in-
stance, in what these bubbles actually did to others but chiefly in the inter-
nal dynamics of the individuals from whom they came. The psychologists of that era were dealing with individuals separate from one another. The sociologists were dealing with undifferentiated masses (in this point at least, Comtists and Marxists were in accord). The biologists, social biolo-
gists and evolutionary biologists à la Bergson were equally satisfied with the above formula or at least they did not produce any “open revolt” against
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it. The revolt came—and it is my thesis that careful historical investigation will bear me out—the revolt came unexpectedly from men inspired by a neotheological, or using a more modern term, by an axiological orientation. In many of the great religions ethical prescriptions were part and parcel of their code of morals but they remained imperative and mystic; they were never permitted to become objects of scientific investigation. But when in the beginning of the twentieth century the atheistic and agnostic gospels started to spread world-wide a pro-religious movement which counteracted them developed. It did not seem to differ much at first from the romantic movement of the nineteenth century, for instance, Kierkegaard never divorced himself from Christianity as a framework and was entirely submerged by the imperatives of his private existence, at no time reaching beyond it. The new movement did not appear to be different except for one thing. It began to emphasize the You, the You as a person, the responsibility towards the You instead of only towards the I. Kierkegaard’s fear of losing the “I” in the “You” was transcended by the movement of the You towards the I taking place simultaneously with the movement of the I towards the You. Gradually some interpretations were given of the You and I which created for it a radically new position; the idea of meeting between you and I, and any number of Thou’s and I’s forming a community; the idea of the “moment”, neither as a function of the past nor of the future, but as a category in itself; the idea of the “situation” and the challenges emerging from it; the ideas of spontaneity and creativity as universal processes of conduct, countering the clichés of the ethical and cultural conserves; and above all the idea of urgency, the urgency of their immediate application. Although they were deeply saturated with value feelings and ethical aspirations they had an amystical appearance and a character which one could call “axio-pragmatic”. This countermovement had a theoretical and a practical part. The most popular practical manifestation of the revolt was Mahatma Gandhi. He is mentioned here because of his spiritual and anti-materialistic message; theoretically he was a reactionary conservative. Gandhi’s India did not need and was not ready for a theoretical revolt. The focus of the theoretical inspiration was naturally assigned to Central Europe (as it was in a parallel situation with the nineteenth century revolt culminating in Marx and Kierkegaard as the two extremes). European culture, especially in its axiological top structure was threatened from all sides. It is here therefore, where the revolt massed itself. One has to study the trail blazed by some of the neo-protestants following Kierkegaard as Ferdinand Ebner (1921), some of the neo-Tolstoyan disciples, some of the Rus-
sian writers influenced by Dostojewsky as Ssolowjow and Berdjajew, some of the French neo-catholics like Péguy and Rimbaud, some modern exponents of chassidism like Martin Buber and my own anonymous writings with the "Invitation to a Meeting" (1914) as the central core, in order to come face to face with the original inspirations out of which interpersonal theory and sociometry grew.

All these groups must be counted in as having pioneered the new idea as to what constitutes truly human relationships and to have prepared the ground for experimentation. Prior to this the structure of the "I" had the central position. In the new theory of relationships the structure of the You's moved into the center. And suddenly, out of this insight the imperative of the meeting, of the two-way encounter was born, the "invitation to a meeting," one meeting with the other in the fullest realities of themselves and in the fullest responsibility toward the immediate situations. It is thus that by ethically oriented situational imperatives the groundwork of modern interpersonal theory was laid. Faced with the dilemma of Marxism the secularly oriented social sciences appeared in themselves impotent in integrating it into or creating the necessary counter concepts and counter instruments. The religious masses of mankind, in retreat against the onslaught of atheism and agnosticism shocked their leaders into a new assessment as to what the essence of all great religious teaching has been and the result was spontaneity-creativity, sociometry and sociodrama, the gift of a dying religious world towards the foundations of a new social and axiological order. This hypothesis of the axiological origin of modern interpersonal theory throws a new light upon the gradual emergence, approximately a decade later, of social thinkers in Europe and the United States, who paved the way towards a science of human relations. They, as for instance G. H. Mead, F. Znaniecki, W. J. Thomas, L. von Wiese, P. Sorokin, G. Gurvitch, could not help being influenced by the ethical and axiological concepts which dominated our cultural climate.

It was a lucky chain of circumstances which made me the spearhead of the new ideas so many years ahead of others and of men much older than myself. As compared with Buber my insistence upon immediate religious action and my theorizing of the moment and the meeting, versus his interest in retrospective prophesy, was an asset. On the other hand, my interest in exact science, my early acquaintance with psychiatry and psychoanalysis (my work at the Psychiatric Institute in Vienna began in 1911), in addition to my preoccupation with practical axiology gave me an advantage over sociological and psychological colleagues and inspired me to at-
tempt a synthesis, not only for science's sake but also in order to maintain my own mental equilibrium. Among the simplest accounts of my interpersonal theory and practice is the following quotation (taken from my "Rede Über die Begegnung"—Speech About the Meeting—published by Gustav Kiepenheuer Verlag in Potsdam, 1923, p. 24-26).

"Between any particular place wherein any particular persons live and this or any other particular place, in opposite or in all possible directions, there are many countries. And each of these countries has numerous districts. And every district has so and so many communities. And every community may have more than hundred or more than thousand persons. And each person, when one meets the other, lays claim, one upon the other.

There are situations for one, there are situations for two, there are situations for more than two. There are situations for all. When a situation is so characterized that its problem is related to one, then it can not be solved but in the one, the afflicted one, in himself, alone. But when a situation is so constructed that its problem is not related to one, but two, then it cannot be resolved but in the two, by the afflicted two's, through them and between them, alone. But when a situation is so constructed that its problem is not in relation to two but to more than two, then it cannot be resolved but by more than the two, by the afflicted ones, through them and between them, alone. But when a situation


Es gibt Lagen für Einen. Es gibt Lagen für Zwei. Es gibt Lagen für mehr als Zwei. Es gibt Lagen für Alle. Wenn eine Lage so beschaffen ist, dass ihr Thema an Einen haftet, kann es nur in Einen, dem Betroffenen, in ihm selbst gelöst werden. Wenn aber eine Lage so beschaffen ist, dass ihr Thema nicht an Einen, sondern Zweien haftet, kann es nur in Zweien, von den Betroffenen, durch sie hindurch und zwischen ihnen gelöst werden. Wenn aber eine Lage so beschaffen ist dass ihr Thema nicht an Zweien, sondern mehr als Zweien haftet, kann es nur von mehr als Zweien, von den Betroffenen, durch sie hindurch und zwischen ihnen gelöst werden. Wenn aber eine Lage so beschaffen ist, das ihr Thema
is so constructed that its problems is not related to more than two but to all, then it cannot be resolved but by all, by all the ones who are afflicted, through them and between

them.

There are innumerable communities and every community consists of a number of streets. And every street has a number of houses. And every house has a number of apartments. And in every apartment live a number of persons. So there are innumerable millions of persons upon whom our situation depends and whose situation depends upon us. Thus there are innumerable millions of persons who form the knot which chokes us.\textsuperscript{**}

This quotation is lifted from a speech which—like all the dialogues and speeches to which it belongs—is strictly concrete-situational, that means it is not merely a general theorizing on what interhuman or interpersonal relations are, like in a sociological treatise; it is actualized and delivered in the now and here, in a specific setting requiring exactly \textit{this} speech, \textit{this} audience, and \textit{this} actor and the form of delivery it has, in role, gestures and phrasing. Outside of this setting, its locus nascenti and primary situation, it loses its axio-pragmatic significance or, as we sociometrists say today, its adequate motivation. Lifted from the actual speech, recorded, transferred and quoted in this paper, twenty-six years later, it is here reduced to an aesthetic-intellectual reference. Situationally speaking, all religious, philosophical and sociological literature is of such a “secondary” nature. From this point of view the New Testament is at best a “report” of situations; divorced from them and made available for the “coming generations” it is merely a religious conserve. A far more inferior, immediate situation but lived out here and now is qualitatively superior to the high grade new-testamentarian

\textsuperscript{*} For illustrations of interpersonal and group dynamics in situ, see “Der Königroman” (1923) and my “Dialogues and Speeches” (1918-1919) to be published in translation by Beacon House in the fall of 1980.
one. Interpersonal theory and the situational imperative grew therefore, hand in hand. The locus nascendi stimulated also the birth of a new significance of the “moment”. The moment is now related to and a part of the situation. It is no longer a part of “time”, like the ever-vanishing present, related to a past and a future, the endpoint of past episodes and the starting point of future episodes, submitted to cause and effect, to psychological and social determinism. The moment operates in a totally different dimension from the past-present-future continuity; it is tangential, not identical with it.

A simple account as to what the moment means within a situational context is given in my “Rede Über den Augenblick”—Speech About the Moment—published by Gustav Kiepenheuer in Potsdam, 1922, p. 27-29.

“This speech has no past, no recurrence, no future, it is not an heritage and it is not an end-product. It is complete in itself. A feeling must be related to the object of its feeling. A thought must be related to the object of the thought. A perception must be related to the object of the perception. A touching must be in contact with the object of the touching. This speech is the object of our thinking. This speech is the object of our thoughts. This speech is the object of our perception. This speech is the object with which our touching is in contact. Have then all feelings which belong to it, to our object, have they all emerged now and here? Have then all thoughts which belong to it, to our object, have they all emerged now and here? Have then all perceptions which belong to it, to our object, have they all emerged now and here? Have all touches which are to be in contact with our object, have they all emerged here and now? Or have

we had some feelings which are related to the object, did we have them already outside of the object, unconnected with it? Feelings which have emerged in the passage of time, without it and have vanished without? Or have we had some thoughts which are related to the object, did we have them already outside of it, unconnected with it, which have emerged in the passage of time, outside of it and have vanished outside of it? Or did we have some images which are related to the object, did we have them outside of it, unrelated to it, which have emerged in the passage of time, outside of it and have vanished outside of it? Or did we have some touches with the object outside of it, unconnected with it, which have emerged in the passage of time, outside of it and have vanished outside of it? We did not have them. Feelings for it, thoughts of it, perceptions of it, touches with it, which have to emerge and vanish only now and here, have emerged and have vanished now and here.

"What is it, therefore, that I, the producer of this speech, must say about it? It is not a speech which was prepared in advance of the situation. It had reason to emerge and no part of it is missing. It did not step in to replace necessary pause and silence. It did not force itself in to replace another speech which may have been more fitting. Gefühle, die auf sie bezogen waren, schon auser ihr, unverbunden mit ihr gehabt, die auf der Zeitstrecke ohne sie entstanden und erloschen sind? Oder haben wir manche Gedanken, die auf sie bezogen waren, schon auser ihr, unverbunden mit ihr gehabt, die auf der Zeitstrecke ohne sie entstanden und erloschen sind? Oder haben wir manche Bilder, die auf sie bezogen waren, schon auser ihr, unverbunden mit ihr gehabt, die auf der Zeitstrecke ohne sie entstanden und erloschen sind? Oder haben wir manche Bilder, die auf sie bezogen waren, schon auser ihr, unverbunden mit ihr gehabt, die auf der Zeitstrecke ohne sie entstanden und erloschen sind? Oder haben wir manche Berührungen mit ihr, auser ihr unverbunden mit ihr gehabt, die auf der Zeitstrecke ohne sie entstanden und erloschen sind? Wir haben sie nicht gehabt: Gefühle für sie Gedanken über sie, Wahrnehmungen von ihr, Berührungen mit ihr, die nur hier zu entstehen und vergehen haben, sind nur hier entstanden unterloschen.

It is unique, unreplaceable, cannot be improved upon. No word is missing in it, no phrase is missing in it, no thought is missing in it. It has a correct beginning, the correct ending. One sentence develops out of the other, one word develops out of the other, one thought develops out of the other, in logical sequence. It is adequate. Therefore it can be considered as appropriately produced."

These were my origins. Whenever I turned away from ethical-philosophic to scientific objectives I could draw from my old saving accounts. As one can see from the quotations above they take no sides, they can easily be applied universally, except for manner of speech they could be the position of an operational social scientist or sociometrist of today. It is with this heritage of insight and instruments that I moved into the development of sociometry.

Foundations of Sociometry

Interpersonal theory, sociometry, group psychotherapy, psychodrama, and sociodrama are of the same paternity, branches of the same tree; they grew up and belong together (in this sense psychoanalysis and projection techniques are branches of another tree).

The contribution which sociometry made consists of ideas; it is not a sum of several techniques here or there. Its ideas are the fountainhead from which theoretical frameworks, concepts and methods have sprung. Probably the most important influence which sociometry exercised upon the social sciences is the urgency and the violence with which it pushed the scholars from the writing desk into actual situations, urging them to move into real communities and to deal there with real people; urging them to move in personally and directly, with a warm and courageous heart, implemented with a few hypotheses and instruments, instead of using go-betweens as translators and informants; urging them to begin with their science now and here (action research), not writing for the millennium of the library shelves.

My premise before starting to build the theoretical framework of sociometry was to doubt the value of and discard all existing social concepts, not to accept any sociological hypothesis as certain, to start from scratch,
to start as if nothing would be known about human and social relations. It was a radical pushing out from my consciousness at least, all knowledge gained from books and even from my own observations. I insisted upon this departure not because I did not assume that other scholars before me had excellent ideas, but because their observations were in most cases authoritative instead of experimental. The naïveté therefore, with which I went after my objectives was not that of a man who is ignorant of what other scholars have done before him, but that of one who tries to be ignorant in order to free himself from clichés and biases, in the hope that by warming up to the role of the naive he might be inspired to ask a novel question.

Thus I tried to erase from my memory and particularly from my operations terms and concepts as individual, group, mass, society, culture, We, community, state, government, class, caste, communion and many others for which there were dozens of good and bad definitions, but which appeared to block my way of making the simplest possible start. I could not help, of course, using these terms frequently in my writings, but I always used them with the suspicion that they did not represent social reality and may have to be replaced by the truly reality-bearing concepts.*

**Difference Between Sociometry and Psychology**

I am in agreement with the position taken by Gurvitch that "social groups are a reality sui generis, irreducible to the elements of which they are

* Note: I am often represented as being partial to psychiatric concepts and as poorly acquainted with sociological and psychological contributions of the past, for instance by F. Znaniecki, G. Gurvitch, and L. von Wiese. However, the instance of my being a psychiatrist by vocation has been falsely interpreted. Before I attended medical school my world view was already formed. I had studied philosophy at the University of Vienna, psychology and semantics under Adolf Stöhr, mathematics under Wirtinger, Gestalt theory under Swoboda, but even these influences were secondary to my private studies of theology and philosophy. The scope of my reading was only in a small portion medical. It encompassed all the departments of science and included considerable sociological literature. Among the sociologists whom I read was Georg Simmel, "Die Philosophie des Geldes", Lazarus, Stein and Bachofen, Marx and Engels, Froudholm and Sorel, and when I became Editor of a monthly journal, *Daiman*, in February 1918, only one psychiatrist was among the contributing editors, Alfred Adler, two sociologists, Max Scheler and H. Schmidt, the poets Franz Werfel, Franz Kafka, Heinrich Mann, Jakob Wasserman, Ottokar Bresina, religionists like Francis Jammes and Martin Buber. From the company of these men it does not look as if I would have been overly influenced by psychiatrists in the development of sociometry. It should not be denied that psychoanalysis as a "negative" factor had a powerful effect upon my formulations. The same thing, however, can be said about Marxism in my sociological, and about Spinozaism in my theological orientation.
composed” (see this volume, page 16). This is in full accord with the core of my writings.

The relation of sociometry to other social sciences, especially to psychology has been put forth by me in my leading article: “Sociometry in Relation to Other Social Sciences” (Volume I, Number 1 of Sociometry, p. 206-220). I never deviated from this position.

“The responses received in the course of sociometric procedure from each individual, however spontaneous and essential they may appear, are materials only and not yet sociometric facts in themselves. . . . As long as we (as auxiliary ego) drew from every individual the responses and materials needed, we were inclined—because of our nearness to the individual—to conceive the tele as flowing out of him towards other individuals and objects. This is certainly correct on the individual-psychological level, in the preparatory phase of sociometric exploration. But as soon as we transferred these responses to the sociometric level and studied them not singly but in their interrelations, important methodological reasons suggested that we conceive this flowing feeling, the tele, as an inter-personal or more accurately and more broadly speaking, “as a sociometric structure.”

The Difference Between Sociometry and Sociology

I am in agreement with the position taken by Gurvitch that the sociometric concept of reality should give a pre-eminence to collective phenomena in human relations and not concentrate its interest on “inter-mental psychology”.

It is significant, in support of Gurvitch’s comment of a cleavage between collective and intermental psychology, that interpersonal theory was rapidly and well received by psychiatrists. Since 1929, when I met the late Dr. William A. White, an early friend and sponsor of my ideas, interpersonal theory began to make its way. Although only partly recognized—and partly distorted—by him, the late Dr. Harry Stack Sullivan to make them palatable to a declining psychoanalytic ideology, badly in need of a lifesaver.*

Psychiatrists accepted interpersonal theory (which in the last twenty years has changed the tenor of psychiatric textbooks) but they resisted sociometry and group psychotherapy, fearful apparently, of being involved in collective phenomena, which they did not know how to tackle, whereas social psychologists and sociologists welcomed sociometry and contributed

*Lozalties to psychoanalytic theory handicapped Sullivan in accepting my ideas in full, although an increasing withdrawal away from official psychoanalysis and towards group theory can be observed in his writings of recent years.
to its development. By 1941, influenced by the situations in World War Two a general acceptance of group psychotherapy began, but one can observe in the literature a marked division between individual-centered group psychotherapies and group-centered ones. The psychiatrarily oriented workers are inclined to treat an "individual" within a group setting, the sociologically oriented workers try to treat the "group" as a whole. One can observe the same phenomenon in the relationship to action methods, the psychiatrists showing a preference for psychodrama, the sociologists a preference for sociodrama. (Certain inconsistencies in my presentation, especially in the definition of terms are obviously due to the need to carry on our war of persuasion on at least two fronts, psychology and sociology.) However profound and ideologically determined this cleavage may be, we sociometrists can hardly be accused of not having tried to bridge it. Like Gurvitch many other sociologists have recognized the cleavage but they had no device by which to span it. It is exactly here where sociometry made one of its chief contributions. The study of immediate, interpersonal relations, the I and you, the you and I, was not sufficient for sociological requirements. In order to explore the "social group" a procedure was necessary which was able to go beyond the immediate situation. It is by the invention of the sociogram, as we can see clearly now, looking backward, that interpersonal theory was transcended. The forerunner of the sociogram was my interaction and position diagram (See Das Streitjahr, p. 87-95, with sixteen charts) which was apparently the first device consciously constructed for presenting, exploring and measuring social structures as wholes. Therefore, 1923 may be considered as the year when sociometry made its scientific debut.

The position of sociometry in relation to sociology has been put forth by me on many occasions, particularly in Volume I, Number 1 of Sociometry, 1937. I never deviated from that position. While I was chiefly concerned with creating foundations which enable us to study collective phenomena in human relations systematically and accurately, I refused to be contented with elaborate reflections and sophisticated reveries about notions of collectivity, however noble, notions of legal, social or cultural Institutions, although I knew that I would have been in the good company of many distinguished sociologists. I decided to play with thoughts as little as possible but to use my imagination to invent socio-experimental procedures congruous for the task and see what happens in the course of their application.* My iconoclastic and neglectful attitude towards digni-

*See Zerka Tozem, "History of the Sociometric Movement in Headlines" elsewhere in this issue.
fixed and perennial social concepts, as state, religion, family, law, was due
to my conscious refusal to fall in line with the scholarly tradition (and
with my own early preoccupation with axiological ventures of that type),
but to find a new and more promising experimental approach in sociology,
always in the hope that in the course of time sociometric research would
justify my strategic suspension and throw some light upon what group,
class and mass, law, religion and state really are. There can be no question
that a logically coherent and consistent presentation of concepts is essential
to any well balanced scientific system, but in an experimental and oper-
tational science as sociometry there is a logic inherent in the operations
themselves which is able to clarify debatable issues, as for instance, when
one definition of a concept at one time seems to contradict its definition at
another time. What we actually do in the course of sociometric operations,
sociometric test or sociodrama, defines and illustrates our terms and con-
cepts and are able to an extent to make up for some inconsistencies or,
least, to correct perceptions coming from poorly worded definitions.

How do we proceed in sociometric research? First step—collection
of data: "The responses received in the course of sociometric procedure
from each individual, however spontaneous and essential they may appear,
are, materials only and not yet sociometric facts in themselves." Second
step—two social inventions are introduced: the sociogram and the psych-
ogeographical map. A sociogram plots all individuals related to the same
criterion and indicates the relations they have to each other. "A psych-
ogeographical map presents the topographical outlay of a community as
well as the psychological and social currents relating each region within
it to each other region" (see "Who Shall Survive?" p. 241). "The astronomer
has his universe of stars and of the other heavenly bodies visibly spread
throughout space. Their geography is given. The sociometrist is in the
paradoxical situation that he has to construct and map his universe before he
can explore it. The sociogram is... more than merely a method of presenta-
tion. It is first of all a method of exploration. It makes possible the explora-
tion of sociometric facts. The proper placement of every individual and all
interrelations of individuals can be shown on a sociogram. It is at present the
only available scheme which makes structural analysis of a community possi-
ble." "... The sociograms are so devised that one can pick from the primary
map of a community small parts, redraw them, and study them so to speak
under the microscope. Another type of... secondary sociogram results if we
pick from the map of a community large structures because of their func-
tional significance, for instance, psychological networks. The mapping of

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networks indicates that we may devise on the basis of primary sociograms forms of charting which enable us to explore large geographical areas. The matrix of a sociogram may consist in its simplest form of choice, rejection, and neutrality structures. It may be further broken up into the emotional and ideological currents crisscrossing these attraction and rejection patterns. The third step—study and discovery of social structures: "Once the full social structure can be seen as a totality it can be studied in minute detail. We thus become able to describe sociometric facts (descriptive sociometry) and to consider the function of specific structures, the effect of some parts upon others (dynamic sociometry)." We are now able to study interhuman phenomena on the sociological plane, on one hand removed from the limitations of the psychological plane, on the other hand not abstracted and distorted into generalized, lifeless mass-symbolic data. We may now try to discover the truly dynamic social structures which rarely become visible to the microscopic eye. "Viewing the detailed structure of a community, we see . . . a nucleus of relations around every individual which is "thicker" around some individuals, "thinner" around others. This nucleus of relations is the smallest social structure in a community, a social atom. From the point of view of a descriptive sociometry, the social atom is a fact, not a concept, just as in anatomy the blood vessel system, for instance, is first of all a descriptive fact. It attained conceptual significance as soon as the study of development of social atoms suggested that they have an important function in the formation of human society."

"Whereas certain parts of these social atoms seem to remain buried between the individuals participating, certain parts link themselves with parts of other social atoms and these with parts of other social atoms again, forming complex chains of interrelations which are called, in terms of descriptive sociometry, psychological networks. The older and wider the network spreads the less significant seems to be the individual contribution toward it. From the point of view of dynamic sociometry these networks have the function of shaping social tradition and public opinion."*

These are illustrations as to how primary social structure have been discovered, first descriptively, stimulating the construction of fruitful hypotheses. These discoveries have been made by means of what I have called structural or microscopic analysis. There are numerous discoveries still to be made. Unfortunately most researchers, using sociometric techniques have paid ononed attention to the choice-preference index* which is now so widely applied and so superficially from "How many dates do you have?",

"Who are your friends?", to asking children "Whom do you prefer, your father or your mother?" (exploring Freud's Oedipus hypothesis) frequently without mentioning the sociometric paternity. Without structural analysis of sociograms vital questions, as for instance leadership phenomena cannot be answered adequately. This onesidedness is unfortunate but understandable. Quantitative analysis of choices and rejections is easy and immediately rewarding. Structural analysis of sociograms and psychogeographical maps are painstaking, time absorbing and this the more so the larger the communities which are studied. They have to be studied at many and different points in time and space in order to learn how a community develops and spreads. Another onesidedness is the reduction of the sociometric test to a number of questions. Without the spontaneity and the warming up process of the total group to the problem they have in common sociometric tests become worthless. Similarly, a sociometric procedure, without observational, interview and follow up methods on the reality level is crippled, deprived of its meaning. Sociometrists, in order to attain the fullest usefulness of their instruments should combine sociometric tests on the choice and on the reality level with psycho-, socio-, and axiodramatic procedures and should always be ready to make modifications in favor of the community of people to which they are applied.

Sociometry aspires to be a science within its own right. It is the indispensable prologue and preparatory science for all the social sciences. It has several subdivisions like microsociology, microanthropology, microeconomics, microsociatry, microecology and animal sociology. It is not merely a slogan indicating a special type of research, a single method or a number of techniques. Its present stage of development is still embryonic and scattered but there can be no question as to the potentialities of the new science. For the future progress of the social sciences it is of the greatest importance that a science of sociometry is set up and delineated, and its relation to other social sciences defined. Its range and boundaries, its operations and objectives are already more sharply visible than the same references in sociology or anthropology. It does not supplant and it must not overlap with anthropology or economics, for instance, but their findings on the overt, macroscopic level may receive a new interpretation from the point of view of sociometric research. An illustration for this is a recent work "Social Structure" by George P. Murdock (Macmillan Co., New York, 1949, p. 1-22). Dr. Murdock is a distinguished anthropologist who has

made a survey of two hundred and fifty human societies. In their analysis he distinguishes three types of family organization, the nuclear family, the polygamous family and the extended family. This may be so, but a sociometrically oriented microanthropologist, surveying the same two hundred and fifty societies may have added two distinct contributions to the strictly anthropological findings: a) the existence of "informal" group structures surrounding the official family setting like a social aura; b) the existence of "sub"-family forms of social organizations, forms of association including various individuals and structural relations but which may have never crystalized to become a "type", a legally sanctioned and respectable form of family. He may have suggested the hypothesis of a universal sociometric matrix with many varieties of structures underlying all known and potential family associations, an interweaving and crossing of numerous sociatomic and culturalatomic processes, but not necessarily identical with the family of one type or another as a social group. Indeed, the matrix, being full of cross currents, and contradictions may, because of its very essence, never be able to mature to a social institution. It is more strategic to explore living, instead of dead cultures and the study of our own culture should be carried out with the full participation of the people; they should not be treated as if they were half dead. The study of dead cultures themselves would gain considerably by their resurrection within a sociodramatic setting.

The Difference Between Sociometry and Anthropology

I am in full agreement with Gurvitch and von Wiese that the processes associating individuals and forming a social group are not of "an exclusively emotional character." (See Leopold von Wiese, elsewhere in this issue, p. 203.) I have repeatedly taken the position that emotional characteristics are only a part of the total social process, although crucial. May I quote here one of my early discussions of interpersonal relationships (in Das Stegreiftheater, p. 28-29) as follows: "Sie is von allen Begriffen der Psychologie verschieden. Affekt sagt nicht dasselbe aus. Denn nicht nur Angst, Furcht, Zorn, Hass sind Lagen, sondern ebenso Komplexe wie Hofflichkeit, Grobheit, Leichtsinn, Hoheit und Schnauheit oder Zustande wie Beschränktheit und Trunksucht. Auch Bezeichnungen wie Gefühl oder Zustand entsprechen nicht völlig. Denn mit Lage ist nicht nur ein innerer Vorgang, sondern auch eine Beziehung nach aussen gemeint—zur Lage einer anderen Person." (Translated: "It differs from all concepts in psychology. The term affection does not express it, because not only anxiety, fear, anger, hate can be contained in relationships, but also complexes as politeness, rudeness, levity, haughtiness and shrewdness, or conditions like mental inferiority and drunkenness.
Terms like feeling or condition do not cover the content of the relationship either, because with relationship not only an internal process is indicated but also a social, external relationship towards another person.)

A complete sociometric procedure may go down to the bottom of relations and may begin with mobilizing the choices and decisions, the attractions and repulsions, but it should never stop with this. It goes through several steps, up the ladder, exploring the motivations for these choices which may show up to be emotional, intellectual or "axionormative." It goes further and puts the individuals linked in social atoms through spontaneity tests which may show of what emotions an attraction or rejection consists. It goes further into role testing, psychodramatic and sociodramatic productions in the course of which the whole gamut of interhuman dynamics comes to the fore. Of particular importance should be to anthropologists the concept of the cultural atom which is an essential part of my role theory. The role theory which I have introduced into literature independent from G. H. Mead and, whereas the philosopher Mead never descended from the lofty levels of speculation and observation, we provided role theory with experimental methods and empirical foundations.

The Difference Between Sociometry And Axiology

I am in full agreement with Gurvitch and Zazzo as to the need of integrating the "we" feeling, the concepts of community and communion into the sociometric framework. The rapidly growing use of psychodrama and axiodrama in departments of theology and the wide interest they arouse in religiously oriented cooperatives speaks for itself. I am fully aware, however, that there is a long way from the practical use of a method to its scientific integration.

Sociometry and the Doctrine of Spontaneity

I am in full agreement with Sorokin that the concept of spontaneity (s)-creativity (c) is in need of further elucidation. I never contended that spontaneity and creativity are identical or similar processes. They are indeed different categories, although peculiarly linked. In the case of Man his s may be diametrically opposite to his c; an individual may have a high degree of spontaneity but be entirely uncreative, a spontaneous idiot. Another individual may have a high degree of creativity within a limited area of experience but may be capable of spontaneity only in reference to this area; he may be incapable or little able of spontaneity in other areas. God is an exceptional case because in God all spontaneity has become creativity. He is one case in which spontaneity and creativity are identical. At least,
in the world of our experience we may never encounter pure spontaneity or pure cultural conserves, they are functions of one another. A cultural conserve, for instance, a musical or a drama conserve needs some degree of spontaneity and warming up in order to produce an adequate response and performance within a social setting. On the other hand an extemporaneous producer cannot help but relate himself to cultural clinches, even if it means that he tries to deconservize them. Spontaneity and the warming up process have no premiums for extraverts, they are equally pertinent to introverts. They operate on all levels of human relations, eating, walking, sleeping, sexual intercourse, social communication, creativity and in religious self realization and asceticism.4

Summary

The great problem which the Western civilization in the twentieth century faces is that after having driven people out from the protective walls of strong and cohesive religious systems, it is anxious to replace them by strong and cohesive secular systems—with the aid of science. The difficulty is that science, especially social science progresses slowly. Then, scientific hypotheses vary and often contradict one another. The automatic safety of the autocratic systems is not easily replaceable, but what is worse, there is no hope, no guiding star given to mankind by science. What people see is, parallel with the ever-new emergence and accumulation of technological gadgets, the ever-new announcements and accumulations of social research techniques without any over-all vision as to how these millions of little items may ever fit into a single mosaic. This is a great but tragic sight, a wide spread of spontaneity and creativity emanating from thousands of fine minds, each trying to help by making their contributions, but because of continuous contradictions they increase the confusion of values. Doubt rises in the hearts of men that they may have escaped from a prison but landed in a jungle of scientific trappings. Faith in science begins to wane in many places because it does not keep the promises it has made. But science is neutral, it is knowledge, it cannot save by itself. The title of George A. Lundberg's recent book “Can Science Save Us?” may have to be reversed into “Can Science Be Saved?” It will be crippled or perish if it cannot create the foundations of a new social order. It can be saved if the

4I wish I could answer the brilliant and challenging comments of Sorokin more completely in this paper especially as to the relationship of spontaneity to energy, but I refer the reader to my paper “The Doctrine of Spontaneity-Creativity” which will appear in a symposium edited by Pitirim A. Sorokin and to be published in the course of 1926 by the Harvard University Press.
responsible domain of social science is further extended to include the immediate and practical structuring and guidance of present day human society on all its levels from the physical up to the axiological plane. This job may have to begin with "burying the dead", cleaning up our research shelves and laboratories, and concentrating all our efforts upon a few strategically selected points. The weakest spot in the armor of present day society and culture is its ignorance of its own social structure, especially of the small local structures in which people actually spend their lives. The time has come, after twenty-five years of research in "catacombs", as prisons, hospitals, reformatories, schools, that sociometry moves from the closed into the "open" community. It is essential therefore, that we move "fearlessly", armed with powerful and dynamic social inventions into the midst of every town, every region, county and state and dare to shake them out of their dreams of individual psyche existence. Only by means of such practical, direct and immediate demonstrations of the usefulness of the social sciences can the faith in science be regained and cemented. Only by such means can science be saved and put to full use. With the cooperation of "all" the people we should be able to create a social order worthy of the highest aspirations of all times. This, and this alone is the meaning of revolutionary, dynamic sociometry.